



IS TEXTUALISM DOOMED? 
ILYA SOMIN† 
In response to Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Tex-
tualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 117 (2009). 
 
In a provocative recent article, Jonathan Siegel argues that textual-
ism is ultimately doomed to irrelevance because its “inexorable radica-
lization . . . will cause it to lose the interpretation wars.”1  Siegel con-
tends that textualism’s commitment to the “axiom” that “the statutory 
text is the law” renders it blind to all competing considerations, the-
reby forcing textualist judges to enforce “absurd” interpretations of 
statutes and ones based on “scrivener’s errors.”2  Over time, textualism 
will “work itself pure,” eliminating any constraints on its inherent log-
ic.3  This in turn is likely to make the results of textualism so unattrac-
tive that it will lose out to rival approaches such as purposivism and in-
tentionalism.4 
Siegel has made a compelling argument and identified some poss-
ible genuine weaknesses of textualism.  I believe he is correct to con-
clude that textualism is unlikely to win a decisive victory in the 
longstanding debate over interpretation.  But both his normative cri-
tique of textualism and his positive prediction about textualism’s fu-
ture are overdrawn. 
In Part I of this Response, I take issue with elements of Siegel’s 
normative analysis.  I argue that textualism’s adherence to text is 
† Associate Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law.  
1 Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
117, 178 (2009). 
2 Id. at 144-45. 
3 Id. at 153. 
4 Id. at 177-78. 
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compatible with eliminating scrivener’s errors.  On the other hand, it 
may not be compatible with allowing judges to strike down what they 
consider to be “absurd” interpretations of statutes that are dictated by 
the text.  This, however, may be a strength of textualism rather than a 
weakness in a society with deep ideological disagreements over what 
counts as “absurd.” 
Part II argues that Siegel understates the importance of textual 
ambiguity.  Where the text is ambiguous, resort to extrinsic evidence 
of meaning is compatible with textualist premises and may sometimes 
even be required by them.  The purpose of a statute and its legislative 
history may shed light on the meaning of ambiguous language by re-
vealing the context in which it was enacted.  So long as this type of 
evidence is used to interpret the meaning of an ambiguous text rather 
than override the meaning of a clear one, textualists need not categor-
ically reject it. 
Part III takes up the question of textualism’s future.  Even if Siegel 
is correct about the radicalizing logic of textualism, textualist judges 
may not follow it to its limits.  Unlike legal scholars, judges are chosen 
by a political process that does not emphasize adherence to broad 
theories of interpretation.  Few judges feel a strong imperative to push 
logical consistency to its limits.  They may well be content to make use 
of textualist methodology without acting on all the logical implica-
tions of doing so. 
Given the intuitive appeal of textualism and the weaknesses of its 
rivals, textualism might well remain influential even if it is flawed for 
the reasons Siegel suggests.  On the other hand, it is unlikely to com-
pletely vanquish the opposition.  The same pragmatic mindset that 
leads judges to embrace a relatively moderate version of textualism is 
likely to prevent judges from rejecting alternative methodologies 
completely.  Ultimately, most judges place less value on methodologi-
cal consistency than academics do.  For that reason, we may have to 
wait a long time for “the interpretation wars” to reach any definitive 
resolution. 
I.  HOW RADICAL IS TEXTUALISM? 
Siegel’s key argument is that the textualist principle that “[t]he 
text is the law”5 precludes recognition of any competing considera-
5 Id. at 120 (quoting Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System:  The 
Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION:  FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 22 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)). 
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tions.  He takes issue with recent attempts by Jonathan Molot,6 Caleb 
Nelson,7 and John Manning8 to reconcile textualism with elements of 
other interpretive methodologies.9  Siegel contends that if the text re-
ally is the law, then no other considerations can be allowed to override 
it.  Thus, he believes that textualists are required to enforce the text 
even if doing so leads to absurd results or to the perpetuation of “scri-
vener’s errors.”10  Textualists must enforce even “[f]lat-out statutory 
errors” if they remain true to their methodology.11 
In reality, textualism need not be as rigid as Siegel suggests.  
There is no inconsistency between adherence to text and correcting 
scrivener’s errors. 
Textualists are indeed committed to the proposition that the text 
is the law.  But which text?  The text that is “the law” is that which has 
been duly enacted in accordance with the procedures outlined in the 
Constitution, which require it to be voted on by a majority of both 
houses of Congress and then presented to the president.12  As promi-
nent textualist Judge Frank Easterbrook put it,  textualism rests “on 
the constitutional allocation of powers.  The political branches adopt 
texts through prescribed procedures; what ensues is the law.”13  That is 
the root of what Siegel calls the “textualists’ formalist axiom.”14 
But if the text in the United States Code contains a clerical error 
that makes it different from the one that members of Congress 
thought they had before them when they voted, it is not in fact the 
same text that was enacted in accordance with constitutionally man-
dated procedures.  In such a case, the text would not actually be “the 
law” for precisely the formalist reasons that Siegel claims ultimately 
require textualists to enforce scrivener’s errors. 
6 See generally Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1 (2006) (arguing that textualism has triumphed over purposivism and that scho-
lars should focus on the few remaining areas of disagreement). 
7 See generally Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347 (2005) (ar-
guing that textualists and intentionalists share the common goal of identifying and en-
forcing the legislature’s intent and differ only on the best way to do so). 
8 See generally John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 CO-
LUM. L. REV. 70 (2006) (claiming that textualists and intentionalists agree on many is-
sues); John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419 (2005) (ar-
guing that the “intent” textualists seek to discern is the intent that a reasonable person 
would infer from the text of the law, not the specific intent of the legislators). 
9 Siegel, supra note 1, at 131-44. 
10 Id. at 142-53. 
11 Id. at 143. 
12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
13 In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir. 1989). 
14 Siegel, supra note 1, at 144. 
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To be sure, an error in transcription of this sort must be distin-
guished from a situation where there is no question that the text in 
the United States Code is the same as that which Congress voted on, 
but the legislators simply overlooked the ways in which that text might 
defeat their purposes.15  In some instances, it may be difficult to tell 
the difference between a scrivener’s error and legislation that is poor-
ly drafted.  Textualists as well as nontextualists may disagree among 
themselves as to whether a scrivener’s error has actually occurred.  
Where one clearly has happened, however, judicial repudiation of the 
error does not conflict with textualism’s formalist axiom.  Indeed, 
such correction may even be required by it.  After all, adhering to a 
text created by a clerical error means imposing a “law” that has not ac-
tually been enacted by the processes required by the Constitution. 
Siegel is on firmer ground in arguing that textualism requires 
judges to uphold statutes that lead to seemingly “absurd” results.16  
Even if a duly enacted statutory text leads to such outcomes, it has still 
passed through the procedural requirements mandated by the Consti-
tution and is therefore still law as textualists define it.  Where Siegel 
errs is in assuming that this result is intolerable.  While it may some-
times lead to the enforcement of flawed policies, it is not clear that 
judicial efforts to root out absurdity will on balance prevent more 
harm than they cause. 
In practice, the absurdity doctrine leads judges to root out statuto-
ry language that seems absurd to them.  As Lord Bramwell famously 
put it, “what seems absurd to one man does not seem absurd to 
another.”17  In an ideologically diverse society such as our own, what 
seems absurd to conservatives may not seem so to liberals or liberta-
rians, and vice versa.  Judges’ interpretations of “absurdity” will inevit-
ably be influenced by their own ideological predispositions. 
Some laws that seem absurd to judges because of their ideological 
perspectives may actually be beneficial.  There is no reason to expect 
that allowing judges to eliminate what they perceive to be absurd laws 
will remove more harmful statutory texts than good ones.  My point is 
15 This is what may have happened in the case of the Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005, Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.), discussed 
by Siegel, in which a probable clerical error changed the phrase “not more than seven 
days” to “not less than seven days.”  See Siegel, supra note 1, at 138-42. 
16 See id. at 145-47 (arguing that the absurdity exception conflicts with “textual-
ism’s fundamental tenet”). 
17 Hill v. E. & W. India Dock Co., (1884) 9 App. Cas. 448, 464-65 (H.L.) (appeal 
taken from Eng.). 
2010] Is Textualism Doomed? 239 
not that eliminating such “absurdities” is necessarily harmful.  I mere-
ly wish to question Siegel’s assumption that failure to do so will lead to 
terrible results, so much so that it discredits textualism. 
To be sure, one could try to limit the ideological bias that infects 
the absurdity doctrine by confining it to cases where “all mankind 
would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the application.”18  But 
such cases are likely to be extremely rare in an ideologically diverse 
society.19  That which seems absurd to conservatives may often seem 
desirable to liberals for precisely the reasons that the former believe it 
to be absurd.  In the rare instances where a statutory text really does 
meet with such universal disapprobation, the legislature might well 
correct the error itself, especially if that error has any substantial effect 
on important policies. 
II.  STATUTORY AMBIGUITY AND METHODOLOGICAL CONVERGENCE 
A key element of Siegel’s case against textualism is that it suppo-
sedly cannot assimilate any of the insights of rival theories.20  Because 
textualism insists that only the text can be the law, he argues that it is 
necessarily blind to the possible utility of purpose-based statutory 
analysis, legislative history, and other alternative tools. 
Siegel may be correct with respect to cases where the statutory text 
is clear.  In such situations, textualists cannot consistently permit the 
text to be trumped by other considerations.  In situations where the 
text is ambiguous, however, textualists can use other methodologies to 
interpret it without sacrificing their fundamental axiom.  Siegel him-
self concedes that “[g]ood textualists do not insist that text must be 
interpreted literally and without consideration of context. . . . Rather, 
textualists recognize that where a statutory term has multiple mean-
ings, context should inform an interpreter’s understanding of which 
meaning applies.”21  As Siegel notes, textualist judges and legal scho-
lars such as Justice Scalia and Professor John Manning have also rec-
ognized the relevance of context.22 
18 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 203 (1819). 
19 The incidence of such cases is likely to be even lower if we remember that the 
relevant universe is limited to absurd statutory texts that are not scrivener’s errors.  For 
reasons explained above, even strict textualist judges can consistently “correct” the latter. 
20 Siegel, supra note 1, at 168-71. 
21 Id. at 154. 
22 See id. (citing Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 241-44 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing); John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2461-62 (2003)). 
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He insists, however, that “[c]onsideration of purpose is differ-
ent.”23  Textualists, he contends, cannot give it any weight without sa-
crificing the axiom that the text is the law. 
It is difficult to see why textualists can consider the “context” of an 
ambiguous statute but not its intended purpose.  After all, the pur-
pose intended by the statute’s drafters is itself a part of the context in 
which the text was enacted.  Textualists argue that an ambiguous text 
should be interpreted in accordance with the meaning understood at 
the time of enactment.  For example, Justice Scalia contends that 
judges’ “job begins with a text that Congress has passed and the Presi-
dent has signed,” and they must “read the words of that text as an or-
dinary Member of Congress would have read them.”24  Presumably, 
the ordinary member’s reading would at least to some extent be influ-
enced by the purpose for which the statute was enacted.  For that rea-
son, statutory purpose may be a part of the historical context that tex-
tualists may refer to in interpreting an ambiguous statute. 
Siegel cites several textualist judges for the proposition that tex-
tualists “look on consideration of statutory purpose with suspicion.”25  
However, these judges’ suspicions seem to be focused on cases where 
consideration of purpose is disconnected from the text.  Thus, Justice 
Scalia condemns courts that consider “purpose, independent of the lan-
guage in a statute,”26 and Judge Easterbrook denounces the “[t]he invo-
cation of disembodied purposes, reasons cut loose from the language” of the 
text.27  These statements are perfectly consistent with using evidence 
of purpose to illuminate the meaning of an ambiguous statute.  There 
is a distinction between using intent in a way that overrides or ignores the 
statutory text and using it to shed light on the meaning of unclear text. 
The same consideration can even be used to provide a textualist 
justification for using legislative history when interpreting vague text.  
After all, legislative history could potentially provide evidence of the 
historical context of the text and how it was interpreted at the time of 
enactment.  It can do so in much the same way as evidence of lan-
guage usage from contemporary dictionaries and other sources that 
23 Id. at 154-55. 
24 Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 405 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
25 Siegel, supra note 1, at 155. 
26 K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 325 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added). 
27 Walton v. United Consumers Club, Inc., 786 F.2d 303, 310 (7th Cir. 1986) (em-
phasis added). 
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textualists do not object to using.28  Contra Justice Scalia, textualists 
need not “object to the use of legislative history on principle.”29  Even 
as strong a textualist as Judge Easterbrook has recognized this, noting 
that “judges may learn from the legislative history even when the text 
is ‘clear.’  Clarity depends on context, which legislative history may il-
luminate.”30 
Textualists cannot allow purpose or legislative history to trump 
the text.  But they can use either or both to illuminate the meaning of 
an otherwise unclear statute by shedding light on the historical con-
text in which it was enacted. 
As both Siegel and the textualists agree, such uses of purpose and 
legislative history sometimes mislead more than they help.  For exam-
ple, legislative history may reflect only the views of a few unrepresentative 
legislators and staffers and purpose-based analysis may sometimes 
attribute a unitary purpose to a fractious legislature where none exists.31 
It is possible that these dangers of considering purpose and legis-
lative history outweigh the possible benefits.  For present purposes, I 
take no position on this longstanding debate.  However, textualism 
does not categorically rule out the use of these tools merely because it 
insists that only the statutory text can be law.  Rather, that textualist 
axiom leaves open the possibility that legislative history and purpose 
might shed light on the context in which an ambiguous statute was 
enacted.  Whether the costs of pursuing that possibility outweigh the 
benefits is a different question. 
III.  WHY TEXTUALISM WILL NOT “WORK ITSELF PURE” 
Even if I am wrong to argue that the logic of textualism is less rad-
ical than Siegel supposes, textualism is unlikely to fade away as he 
predicts.  He claims that “it is difficult to sustain a contradiction within 
judge-made doctrine indefinitely” because “[i]f a judicial doctrine 
contains an illogical contradiction, judges and scholars will point it out, 
and the force of their criticism will create pressure to reform the doc-
trine.”32  For this reason, “judge-made law works itself pure over time.”33  
28 See, for example MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 224-29 (1994), 
a well-known Scalia opinion where he uses dictionary definitions to interpret a key sta-
tutory term. 
29 Scalia, supra note 5, at 31. 
30 In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1342 (7th Cir. 1989). 
31 Cf. Siegel, supra note 1, at 132-33, 171 (endorsing, at least partially, the validity 
of these arguments). 
32 Id. at 148-49. 
33 Id. at 149. 
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Siegel therefore predicts that textualism is likely to become more and 
more radical over time because of the supposed logical incompatibility 
between textualism and other methodologies of interpretation.34 
I do not deny that such “pressure” for consistency exists.  But it is 
weaker than Siegel supposes.  As Richard Posner has recently empha-
sized, “Judges [a]re [n]ot [l]aw [p]rofessors.”35  They are nominated 
and confirmed through a political process that emphasizes ideology, 
connections to politicians, and general professional competence, not 
methodological consistency of the sort valued by academic theorists.  
Most judges have at best a limited interest in issues of legal theory.  They 
have what Posner calls a “pragmatic” orientation.36  Thus, they are less 
likely to be bothered by occasional inconsistencies than are scholars. 
Siegel himself notes that “[e]ven stalwart textualists such as Justice 
Scalia permit . . . exceptions to the textualist dogma that enacted text 
simply is the law.”37  If even the most committed textualists in the judi-
ciary have not allowed their methodology to “work itself pure” as Sie-
gel expects, it is likely that less dedicated textualists (and those less in-
terested in legal theory than a former academic such as Scalia) will 
continue to tolerate even greater impurities. 
To be sure, Siegel predicts that such contradictions will be elimi-
nated over time and cites a few cases that he believes are indicative of 
this process.38  But in a judiciary that produces thousands of opinions 
each year, it is possible to find a few examples of almost any use of ju-
risprudential methods.  If textualism is indeed “working itself pure” 
after decades of tolerating what Siegel regards as internal contradic-
tions, we need more evidence than this to prove it. 
In noting the pragmatic, atheoretical orientation of most judges, I 
do not mean to praise it.  To the contrary, I believe that judicial 
pragmatism has important shortcomings.39  But whether defensible or 
34 See id. at 148. 
35 RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 204 (2008). 
36 Id. at 207. 
37 Siegel, supra note 1, at 146. 
38 Id. at 138-44, 157-67 (citing Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 
U.S. 81 (2007); Limtiaco v. Camacho, 549 U.S. 483 (2007);; Amalgamated Transit Un-
ion Local 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 435 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 2006), reh’g 
denied, 448 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
39 See Ilya Somin, Richard Posner’s Democratic Pragmatism, 16 CRITICAL REV. 1 (2004) 
(reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003)).  The 
published title of this article was Richard Posner’s Democratic Pragmatism and the Problem of 
Ignorance.  However, the last five words were mistakenly added by the editors of Critical 
Review; by the time the error was discovered, that issue of the journal was already in print. 
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not, the prevalence of pragmatism reduces the likelihood that textual-
ism will “work itself pure” as Siegel predicts. 
A further reason why textualism is likely to persist is its intuitive 
appeal.  Textualism comports with many lay understandings of law as 
a system of rules laid down in an authoritative text that all citizens can 
access to determine whether a proposed course of action is legal.  This 
intuition has its flaws.  But it is nonetheless widely held, including by 
many lawyers and judges.  Its intuitive appeal helps ensure that tex-
tualism will continue to influence judicial decisions. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite Professor Siegel’s cogent analysis, I remain skeptical that 
textualism has an “inexorable logic” as radical as he claims.  It can 
consistently incorporate more insights from other methodologies than 
he gives it credit for.  Even if the logic of textualism is as radical as he de-
scribes, it does not necessarily follow that it will “work itself pure” in a ju-
diciary filled with judges who have far less interest in grand theories of 
interpretation and methodological consistency than academics do. 
None of this proves that textualism is the best possible theory of 
interpretation or that it will ever “win” the interpretive wars.  To the 
contrary, I doubt that any clear winner will emerge anytime soon.  In 
an ideologically diverse judiciary and legal profession, it is unlikely 
that any one theory will command a clear consensus.  Textualism may 
never definitively triumph over its rivals.  But it is nonetheless here to 




 Preferred Citation:  Ilya Somin, Response, Is Textualism Doomed?, 
158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 235 (2010), 
http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/04-2010/Somin.pdf. 
 
